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Both evolutionary considerations and recent research suggest that the color red serves as
a signal indicating an object’s importance. However, until now, there is no evidence that
this signaling function of red is also reﬂected in human memory. To examine the effect of
red on memory, we conducted four experiments in which we presented objects colored
in four different colors (red, green, blue, and yellow) and measured later memory for the
presence of an object and for the color of an object. Across experiments, we varied the
type of objects (words vs. pictures), task complexity (single objects vs. multiple objects in
visual scenes), and intentionality of encoding (intentional vs. incidental learning). Memory
for the presence of an object was not inﬂuenced by color. However, in all four experiments,
memory for the color of an object depended on color type and was particularly high for
red and yellow-colored objects and particularly low for green-colored objects, indicating
that the binding of colors into object memory representations varies as a function of
color type. Analyzing the observers’ conﬁdence in their color memories revealed that
color not only inﬂuenced objective memory performance but also subjective conﬁdence.
Subjective conﬁdence judgments differentiated well between correct and incorrect color
memories for red-colored objects, but poorly for green-colored objects. Our ﬁndings reveal
a previously unknown color effect which may be of considerable interest for both basic
color research and applied settings like eyewitness testimony in which memory for color
features is relevant. Furthermore, our results indicate that feature binding in memory is
not a uniform process by which any attended feature is automatically bound into unitary
memory representations. Rather, memory binding seems to vary across different subtypes
of features, a ﬁnding that supports recent research showing that object features are stored
in memory rather independently from each other.
Keywords: color, memory, binding, subjective confidence, red, green, blue, yellow
INTRODUCTION
Color is a fundamental aspect of our perceptual experience of the
external world and has attracted people’s interest for a long time, as
can be seen in the voluminous body of research conducted over the
past century to examine the physics, physiology, and psychology of
color. In the domain of information processing, numerous studies
have demonstrated that color is one of the basic building blocks
of visual perception. For instance, it has been shown that color is
an effective code to organize our visual world by grouping similar
items and segregating the world into meaningful objects (Fine
et al., 2003; Schulz and Sanocki, 2003).
Surprisingly, although a large amount of researchhas beendone
to determine the general role of color in cognitive processing, the
question of whether speciﬁc types of color1 (such as red, green,
blue, etc.) differentially affect perception, attention, and mem-
ory has attracted little research. However, several recent studies
1We use the term ‘color type’ in the sense of Berlin and Kay (1969) who deﬁned
basic color categories which are organized around universally shared focal points in
color space.
have increased interest in the effects of speciﬁc color categories
by demonstrating that different types of color alert us to different
situational requirements, based on evolutionary predispositions
and learned associations (Elliot et al., 2007; Mehta and Zhu, 2009;
for a review, see Elliot and Maier, 2014). One color which seems
to have particular relevance is the color red. In non-human ani-
mals, red often serves as a signal that another animal or object
is of importance for one’s own survival (Hutchings, 1997; Khan
et al., 2011). Depending on the context, red can act as an appet-
itive signal (e.g., red as a signal for fertility or the ripeness of
fruits; Nunn, 1999; Dominy and Lucas, 2001), or as a warning
signal (e.g., red as a common aposematic color amongst terres-
trial invertebrates; Edmunds, 1974). A similar link between color
and stimulus importance seems to be also present in humans as
can be seen, e.g., in the long-standing practice of using red lip-
sticks and rouge to heighten the attractiveness of women (Ragas
and Kozlowski, 1998), or in the coloring of danger signals (Par-
sons, 1995). Indeed, recent research indicates that red can enhance
the impact of external stimulation both in appetitive and aversive
contexts by demonstrating that red enhances the attractiveness of
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women and men (Elliot and Niesta, 2008; Elliot et al., 2010), and
intensiﬁes the effect of negative stimuli (Kuhbandner and Pekrun,
2013).
The aim of the present work was to examine whether the color
red also inﬂuences human memory. If red serves as a signal to
indicate an object’s importance, then later memory of an object
might also be enhanced when the object was colored in red. Inter-
estingly, although several studies have shown that colored objects
or scenes are generally better remembered than gray-scale images
of the same items (e.g., Borges et al., 1977; Wichmann et al., 2002;
Spence et al., 2006), to the best of our knowledge, it has never been
reported that red-colored objects are more likely to be remem-
bered than other-colored objects. This may simply reﬂect a gap
in prior research. However, it might also be that red does not
inﬂuence whether information about the presence or absence of
an object is retained, but rather whether information about the
color of an object is stored in memory. Indeed, such a hypoth-
esis can also be derived from an evolutionary perspective. As
outlined above, red seems to serve the distinction between dif-
ferent exemplars of the same type according to, e.g., their state
of ripeness or fertility, rather than signaling the general presence
of types of exemplars. Accordingly, red may not have any spe-
ciﬁc function for remembering that there was an exemplar per
se, but may produce an enhanced binding of colors to exemplars
in memory. Such an enhanced binding may be highly adaptive
to memorize the signiﬁcance of individual objects for a person’s
issues and goals.
In fact, such a prediction can also be derived from previous
ﬁndings on the effect of colors on cognitive processes that are
assumed to underlie the binding of features into object represen-
tations. As elaborated in the Feature-integration theory (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980), the different features of an object (e.g., color,
shape, orientation, etc.) are ﬁrst registered automatically and par-
allel in independent feature stores, and in order to bind the features
into object representations, attention is required. Evidence for
this notion comes from studies showing that when attention is
diverted, features of presented objects are sometimes erroneously
recombined, producing illusory conjunctions (e.g., Treisman and
Schmidt, 1982). Thus, given that recent research has shown that
the features of objects are stored in visual memory independently
from each other rather than within a single unitary representation
(Fougnie and Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2013), the binding of
features should vary as a function of how strongly different types
of features attract attention. With regard to color, the color that
most strongly attracts attention seems to be red. Such an assump-
tion has initially been derived from studies in applied contexts
such as advertising, showing that red is the most arousing, excit-
ing, and stimulating color (e.g., Labrecque and Milne, 2011; see
Fraser and Banks, 2004, for a review), and has been supported by
more basic research showing that red is more salient than other
colors (e.g., Gelasca et al., 2005; Frey et al., 2011). Accordingly,
color features may attract more attention when being red, lead-
ing to an enhanced binding of red colors into object memory
representations.
To examine whether the binding of colors to objects in memory
varies as a function of color type, we conducted four experiments.
In all of the experiments, we investigated the effects of coloring
objects in four different basic colors (red, blue, yellow, and green;
see Figure 1) on later memory for the presence of an object and for
the color of an object. The colors red, blue, yellow, and green were
chosen because they represent psychological primary colors and
belong to the limited number of basic colors which can be inter-
nally represented and uniquely identiﬁed across different cultures
(Hård and Sivik, 1981; Regier et al., 2005). In all four experiments,
none of the used objects were pre-experimentally associated with
any particular color. As long-term memory of colors is charac-
terized by color categories rather than by the exact colorimetric
properties of the originally perceived color stimuli (e.g., Heider,
1972; Uchikawa and Shinoda, 1996; Regier et al., 2005), we asked
participants in the memory test to provide a categorical mem-
ory response by making a forced-choice among the four possible
color types. To account for possible effects of biased responding
or guessing (e.g., a general tendency to respond “red”), we applied
a simple multinomial model to the data of each experiment (see
Figure 2), allowing us to quantify color-speciﬁc memory sepa-
rately from color-speciﬁc guessing. To further assess whether color
not only inﬂuences objective memory performance but also sub-
jective conﬁdence in memories, in all experiments, participants
additionally rated their conﬁdence in their color memories (from
1 = extremely uncertain to 5 = extremely certain). Across the
four experiments, we varied (i) the type of objects (words vs. pic-
tures), (ii) task complexity (single objects vs. multiple objects in
visual scenes), and (iii) intentionality of encoding (intentional vs.
incidental learning).
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL MEMORY
In Experiment 1,we examined the effect of speciﬁc colors on verbal
learning. Participants were presented names of prototypic exem-
plars of semantic categories onebyone in red, blue, yellow, or green
font (see Figure 3A, left panel), with the instruction to memorize
each exemplar as well as each exemplar’s color for a later memory
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the colors used in the four experiments.
The colors of the symbols show the colors of the stimuli in Experiment 1
(squares), Experiment 2 (disks), and Experiments 3 and 4 (diamonds). In
Experiment 1, focal colors were used to control for possible effects of color
typicality. In Experiment 2, colors were pairwise equated on lightness, and
in Experiments 3 and 4 additionally on saturation, to account for possible
confounding effects of these color attributes. Note that colors will not be
correctly displayed in print or on an uncalibrated video monitor.
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the multinomial model. Subjects are assumed
to have a veridical memory of an object’s original color (e.g., red) with
probability R (e.g., Rred ), and to guess one of the four colors with the
probability G (e.g., Gred ) in the absence of memory for the object’s original
color.
test. As previous research has shown that primary color categories
are organized around universally shared focal points in color space
(e.g., Boynton et al., 1989; Regier et al., 2005), we used focal colors
as the best examples of a color category in Experiment 1 (for an
illustration of the colors used in the experiments, see Figure 1).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-eight (31 females, M age = 24.3 years) undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the experiment for course credit. They were
tested individually. Participation was restricted to individuals who
were not colorblind (based on self-report). All experiments were
approved according to the ethical standards at the University of
Munich where the experiments were conducted.
Materials
The study list consisted of six semantic categories (ﬁsh, furni-
ture, musical instruments, occupations, tools, vehicles) which
contained eight exemplars each (e.g., vehicles – car; taken from
Mannhaupt, 1983). The initial letter of each word was unique
within its category. Two of the eight exemplars of a category
were presented in red, two in green, two in blue, and two in
yellow font. The assignment of colors to exemplars was coun-
terbalanced across participants. In all experiments, colors were
chosen using a spectrometer (i1Pro, X-rite Inc., Grandville, MI,
USA) according to the device independent CIELAB color space
(Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982). CIELAB coordinates are always speci-
ﬁed with respect to a reference white point, which was in our study
a white light metameric to 60 cd/m2 CIE Standard Illuminant C
[L∗a∗b∗(100.0, 0.0, 0.0)]. In Experiment 1, focal colors were used
to control for possible effects of color typicality [colors were cho-
sen according to Regier et al., 2005; red: L∗a∗b∗(41.2, 61.4, 17.9),
blue: L∗a∗b∗(51.6, −3.4, −48.1), yellow: L∗a∗b∗(81.4, 7.3, 109.12),
green: L∗a∗b∗(51.6, −63.3, 29.0)].
Procedure
In the study phase, the exemplar names were presented together
with their category names one by one in random order for 4 s each
with an interstimulus interval of 0.5 s. In all four experiments,
the stimuli were presented on a white background using Eprime
software version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh,
PA, USA). The order of presentation was determined by blocked
randomization. A random sequence of eight blocks was presented
consisting of one randomly selected exemplar from each of the six
categories. Participants were instructed to memorize each exem-
plar as well as each exemplar’s color for a later memory test. The
study procedure was identically repeated with another random
serial order of the study items. After a 4-min distractor task (solv-
ing simple arithmetic problems),memory for exemplarswas tested
ﬁrst by presenting the ﬁrst letter of each studied exemplar together
with its category name for 4.5 s. This was done to control for
possible effects of output interference. Order of presentation was
blocked by category; within a category, the presentation of the
ﬁrst letters was randomized. The memory test for the exemplars’
colors followed. Each studied exemplar was presented in gray font
together with its category name, and participants were instructed
to indicate in which color it was presented in the study phase by
pressing one of four different buttons showing a red, blue, yel-
low, or green color. Each button was equally often provided with a
speciﬁc color across all participants. Presentation order was again
blocked by category. If the participants did not remember the
color of an exemplar, they were instructed to guess. In all four
experiments, after each color response, participants were asked
to rate their conﬁdence in their color response on a 5-point rat-
ing scale ranging from 1 = extremely uncertain to 5 = extremely
certain.
RESULTS
Table 1 gives an overview of the probabilities observed in the
four experiments for (1) correctly remembering the presence of
an object, (2) correctly classifying the color of an object, and (3)
falsely reporting a speciﬁc color when misclassifying the color of
an object.
In Experiment 1, the probability of correctly remembering the
presence of an object was not inﬂuenced by color [F(3,141)= 1.41,
MSE = 0.020, p = 0.244, η2p = 0.03; mean (M) recall = 0.52].
However, the probability of correctly classifying the color of
an exemplar depended on type of color [F(3,141) = 13.16,
MSE = 0.025, p < 0.001 η2p = 0.22], and was high for red and
yellow-colored exemplars (M red = 0.64; M yellow = 0.59), com-
pared to blue and green-colored exemplars (M blue = 0.50; M
green = 0.45). By contrast, when the color of an exemplar was
misclassiﬁed, the probability of erroneously reporting one of the
remaining colors did not differ across color types [F(3,141)= 0.36,
MSE = 0.036, p = 0.782, η2p < 0.01].
In order to separately quantify color-speciﬁc memory and
color-speciﬁc guessing, we applied a simple multinomial model
to the data (see Figure 2). Multinomial models describe cate-
gorical response probabilities as a function of discrete cognitive
states and can be represented as hierarchical process tree struc-
tures (Batchelder and Riefer, 1999). In our model, we assume
that subjects correctly remember an item’s original color (e.g.,
red) with probability R (e.g., Rred). In the absence of memory
for the item’s original color, with a probability of 1-Rred , sub-
jects are assumed to guess one of the four colors. Color-speciﬁc
guessing (i.e., guessing bias) was modeled by a multinomial
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FIGURE 3 | Study materials (left panels) and results (right panels)
of the four experiments: (A) words, (B) pictures, (C) visual scenes,
and (D) incidental learning. Saturated colors indicate parameter
estimates for color-speciﬁc memory (i.e., probability of remembering
an object’s color), pale colors indicate parameter estimates for
color-speciﬁc guessing (i.e., the tendency to respond with a speciﬁc
color in the absence of memory for an object’s original color).
Parameters were estimated using the multinomial model shown in
Figure 2. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals of the
parameter estimates.
parameter set G, with the restriction Gred = 1–Gblue–Gyellow–
Ggreen. When applied jointly to the response distributions for
each of the four item types, the model had seven free param-
eters (Rred , Rblue , Ryellow , Rgreen, Gblue , Gyellow , Ggreen) to ﬁt 12
independent data points (3 independent responses × 4 object
colors). Thus, the model had 5◦ of freedom for testing its
goodness of ﬁt. The model parameters were estimated using
maximum-likelihood techniques, which also allow for statistical
testing.
Themultinomialmodel described the datawell in Experiment 1
[χ2(5) = 2.54, p = 0.771]. The multinomial-model based param-
eter estimates for color-speciﬁc memory (R) and color-speciﬁc
guessing (G) in Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 3A (right
panel). Replicating the above ANOVA results, Likelihood-ratio
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tests revealed signiﬁcant variations in the memory parameter R
[χ2(3) = 34.54, p < 0.001], but not in the guessing parameter
G [χ2(2) < 1]. Planned pairwise comparisons conﬁrmed that
parameter R was signiﬁcantly increased for red exemplars com-
pared to blue [χ2(1) = 18.02, p < 0.001] and green exemplars
[χ2(1) = 27.76, p < 0.001], and there was a slight trend for R
being higher for red compared to yellow exemplars [χ2(1) = 2.71,
p = 0.100].
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that the probability of
remembering the color in which a word was presented during
initial study varies substantially as a function of color type. In
line with the assumption that red may bring about an enhanced
binding of color features because red often serves as a signal that
a stimulus is of importance for one’s own survival (Hutchings,
1997; Khan et al., 2011), memory for the color of studied words
was higher for red than for blue and green-colored words. Such a
ﬁnding indicates for the ﬁrst time that feature binding in mem-
ory is not a uniform process by which any attended feature of
a stimulus is automatically bound into memory representations.
Rather, our results suggest that particularly important features are
more strongly bound, possible due to increased attentional attrac-
tion during initial encoding (e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980), a
ﬁnding that supports recent ﬁndings showing that the features of
objects are stored in visual memory rather independently from
each other (Fougnie and Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2013).
Although memory for the color of red-colored words was
descriptively higher than for yellow-colored words, the difference
failed to reach signiﬁcance. This may simply reﬂect the fact that
the power of Experiment 1 was too small to detect small-sized
effects. However, given that both red and yellow are linked to
aposematism in insects and reptiles (e.g., Stevens and Ruxton,
2012) and commonly used to indicate caution in signage and brake
lights in human culture (Parsons, 1995), it may also indicate that
binding is also increased for yellow colors. In order to replicate
the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 and to further explore the role of
color type in memory binding, we conducted a second Experi-
ment in which we examined the binding of color features in visual
memory.
EXPERIMENT 2: VISUAL MEMORY
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the ﬁndings of Experi-
ment 1 with visual stimulus materials, and to explore the possible
role of attentional attraction. The design and procedure were sim-
ilar to Experiment 1 with the main difference that pictures of
exemplars instead of names were used as stimuli that were ﬁlled
with either red, blue, yellow, or green colors (see Figure 3B, left
panel). To account for possible confounding effects of low-level
color attributes in Experiment 1 where focal colors were used
that represent the best examples of a color category but vary
in lightness, in Experiment 2 the colors were pairwise equated
on lightness (i.e., red/blue and yellow/green). We expected to
ﬁnd a similar pattern of results than that observed in Exper-
iment 1, with better color memory when visual objects were
initially colored red than when they were colored yellow, blue
or green.
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Furthermore, in order to investigate whether the enhanced
binding for red color may be explained by the assumption that
increased attention to a color feature can produce an enhanced
binding of that feature into object memory representations (e.g.,
Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Wheeler and Treisman, 2002), we
additionally included oddball color pictures (i.e., achromatic pic-
tures that occurred only rarely within the sequence of mostly
chromatic pictures). As oddball stimuli are known to attract atten-
tion (Remington et al., 1992), memory for the color of oddball
pictures should also be enhanced, even although achromatic col-
ors seem not to serve any signaling function (e.g., Parsons, 1995;
Stevens and Ruxton, 2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty (31 females, M age = 24.0 years) undergraduate students
participated in the experiment for course credit. They were tested
individually. Participation was restricted to individuals who were
not colorblind (based on self-report).
Materials
The material was similar to that used in Experiment 1 with
the only difference that pictures instead of names of exemplars
were used as stimuli. The study list consisted of four cate-
gories which contained drawings of 10 prototypic exemplars
(taken from Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980). Two were col-
ored in red, two in green, two in blue, and two in yellow, the
remaining two exemplars showed an achromatic color (gray).
To examine whether the effects of different colors on binding
observed in Experiment 1 depend on speciﬁc low-level physical
color attributes, and to additionally account for possible con-
founding effects of variations in lightness, we slightly varied the
colors used in Experiment 1 and equated the colors pairwise on
lightness (i.e., for red-blue, and for green-yellow). Colors were
pairwise equated because equating all four colors on lightness
would have resulted in relatively untypical colors. Equated here
means functionally equivalent [i.e., within two units on the rele-
vant parameter L; see ref. 33; red: ∗La∗b∗(38.5, 69.7, 64.7), blue:
L∗a∗b∗(36.5, 45.5, −109.4), yellow: L∗a∗b∗(76.7, 1.1, 79.4), green:
L∗a∗b∗(77.6, −85.8, 69.2), gray: L∗a∗b∗(37.0, 0.0, 0.0)]. The
assignment of colors to exemplars was counterbalanced across
participants.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. In the study
phase, the drawings of the exemplars were presented in the middle
of the screen one by one in random order together with their cate-
gory name and the exemplar name (to standardize later retrieval)
for 6 s each. Presentation time was slightly increased because of
the higher complexity of stimuli. After a 5-min distractor task
(solving simple arithmetic problems), memory for exemplars was
tested ﬁrst by presenting the ﬁrst letter of an exemplar together
with its category name. Order of presentation was blocked by cat-
egory; within a category, the presentation of the ﬁrst letters was
randomized. The memory test for the exemplars’ colors followed.
Each exemplar drawing was presented in black-and-white, and
participants were asked to indicate in which color it was initially
presented by pressing one of ﬁve different buttons showing a red,
blue, yellow, green, or gray color.
RESULTS
Memory test performance for the presence of an exemplar and the
color of an exemplar are shown in Table 1. Memory for the pres-
ence of an exemplar was not inﬂuenced by color [F(4,156) = 1.92,
MSE = 0.026, p = 0.110, η2p = 0.047; M recall = 0.45]. How-
ever, replicating the results from Experiment 1, the probability
of correctly classifying the color of an exemplar depended on
type of color [F(4,156) = 4.05, MSE = 0.038, p = 0.004,
η2p = 0.094], and was high for red, yellow, and gray-colored
exemplars (M red = 0.70; M yellow = 0.69; M gray = 0.72),
compared to blue and green-colored exemplars (M blue = 0.62;
M green = 0.58). The probability of erroneously reporting one
of the remaining colors when the color of an exemplar was
misclassiﬁed did also vary with color type [F(4,148) = 4.87,
MSE = 0.037, p = 0.001, η2p < 0.116]; however, this effects
was mainly driven by the low misclassiﬁcation rate observed for
gray colored exemplars (Mfalse gray = 0.15), whereas the mis-
classiﬁcation rate did not differ between the other four colors
[F(3,111) = 2.10, MSE = 0.041, p = 0.104, η2p = 0.054; Mfalse
red = 0.22, Mfalse yellow = 0.33, Mfalse blue = 0.27, Mfalse
green = 0.27).
The multinomial model did not optimally ﬁt the data
[χ2(11) = 21.34, p = 0.030]. Still, stable maximum likelihood
estimates could be derived for each of the model’s parame-
ters. Replicating the above ANOVA results, likelihood-ratio tests
(Figure 3B, right panel) revealed signiﬁcant variations in the
memory parameter R [χ2(4) = 30.86 p < 0.001], and also in
the guessing parameter G [χ2(3) = 25.23, p < 0.001]. Planned
pairwise comparisons conﬁrmed that for red-colored exemplars,
parameter R was signiﬁcantly increased compared to blue-colored
exemplars [χ2(1) = 7.62, p = 0.007] and green-colored exem-
plars [χ2(1) = 13.13, p< 0.001], but was not statistically different
from yellow [χ2(1)< 1] or gray-colored exemplars [χ2(1) = 1.26,
p = 0.262]. With respect to parameterG, the data suggest that gray,
but also red, were guessed relatively rarely (see Figure 3B).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 closely replicate those of Experiment
1. The probability of remembering the color inwhich anobjectwas
presented during initial study varied as a function of color type,
with memory for the color of objects being higher for red than for
blue and green-colored objects. Thus, an enhanced binding of red
colors seems to be a rather fundamental phenomenon that is found
both in verbal and visual memory. The results for the gray-colored
oddball objects suggest that an increased binding of features can
indeed be brought about by attentional attraction. Although gray
color seems not to serve any signaling function (e.g., Parsons,
1995; Stevens and Ruxton, 2012), memory for the color of oddball
objects was as high as memory for the color of red-colored objects.
As oddball stimuli attract attention (Remington et al., 1992), such
a ﬁnding supports the assumption that increased attention to a
color feature can produce an enhanced binding of that feature
(e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Wheeler and Treisman, 2002), a
mechanism that may also underlie the effect of red on binding.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 231 | 6
Kuhbandner et al. Differential binding of colors in memory
As in Experiment 1, although memory for the color of
red-colored objects was descriptively slightly higher than for
yellow-colored objects, the difference failed to reach signiﬁcance.
Given that no statistically signiﬁcant difference was again observed
between red and yellow, this seems to reﬂect the fact that red
and yellow do not differ with respect to binding strength, rather
than the problem of too low power to detect small effect sizes.
In order to further replicate the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 and 2,
and to examine whether the observed effects generalizes to visual
scenes consisting of several differentially colored objects, a third
experiment was conducted.
EXPERIMENT 3: VISUAL SCENES
In Experiments 1 and 2, the to-be-studied stimuli were presented
one by one. The aim of Experiment 3 was to examine whether a
differential binding of colors to objects occurs also when differ-
entially colored objects are embedded in visual scenes so that all
colors are present during a study trial. The material, design, and
procedure were similar to Experiment 2 with the difference that
four different objects colored in red, blue, yellow, or green were
together shown in simple visual scenes (see Figure 3C, left panel).
In addition, to further address the role of potentially confounding
effects of low-level color attributes, in Experiment 3, the used col-
ors were additionally pairwise equated on saturation. We expected
to ﬁnd a similar pattern of results than that observed in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, with better color memory when visual objects were
colored red than when they were colored yellow, blue, or green.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-eight (31 females, M age = 28.0 years) undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the experiment for course credit. They were
tested individually. Participation was restricted to individuals who
were not colorblind (based on self-report).
Materials
The material was the same as that used in Experiment 2 with the
only difference that the drawings of the exemplars were not pre-
sented one by one, but embedded in simple visual scenes. Ten
visual scenes were created containing four different objects each,
colored in red, blue, yellow, or green. The assignment of colors to
objects was counterbalanced across participants. To additionally
account for possible confounding effects of variations saturation,
the colors were pairwise equated on both lightness and satura-
tion [i.e., for red-blue, and for green-yellow; red: L∗a∗b∗ (34.7,
50.8, 19.6), blue: L∗a∗b∗ (33.7, −27.4, −48.0), yellow: L∗a∗b∗
(97.6, −34.9, 100.3), and green: L∗a∗b∗ (98.1, −90.1, 57.2)].
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiments 1 and 2.
In the study phase, the visual scenes were presented one by one
in random order for 12 s each with the instruction to memorize
the objects as well as their colors shown in the visual scenes for
a later memory test. After a 2-min distractor task (solving simple
arithmetic problems), a free-recall test followed in which partic-
ipants were instructed to write down as many of the previously
presented objects as possible for 2 min. A free recall test was cho-
sen because the study material was not presented in a categorized
way during study. A test for the memory for the objects’ colors fol-
lowed in which each object was presented in black-and-white and
participants were asked to indicate in which color it was initially
presented by pressing one of four different buttons showing a red,
blue, yellow, or green color.
RESULTS
Memory for the presence of an object and the color of an object
are shown in Table 1. Probability of recalling an object varied
as a function of color in which the object was presented during
study [F(3,141) = 9.68, MSE = 0.023, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.171].
Green-colored objects were remembered worst (M green = 0.45),
compared to objects colored in one of the other three colors (M
red = 0.57, M blue = 0.56, M yellow = 0.60; all ts > 3.53, all
ps< 0.001), which did not differ from each other [F(2,94) = 1.15,
MSE = 0.024, p = 0.321]. The probability of correctly clas-
sifying the color of an object also depended on type of color
[F(3,141) = 4.69, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.091], and was higher
for red, blue, and yellow-colored objects (M red = 0.55; M
blue = 0.53; M yellow = 0.62), compared to green-colored objects
(M green = 0.46). The probability of erroneously reporting one
of the remaining colors when the color of an object was misclas-
siﬁed did not signiﬁcantly vary with color type [F(3,141) = 1.89,
MSE = 0.039, p = 0.134, η2p = 0.039].
The multinomial model described the data well [χ2(5) = 7.36,
p = 0.195]. The results (Figure 3C, right panel) showed sig-
niﬁcant color-speciﬁc differences in the memory parameter R
[χ2(3) = 23.55, p < 0.001], and also in the guessing parame-
ter G [χ2(2) = 10.69, p = 0.014]. Planned pairwise comparisons
showed that parameter R was of comparable size for red items
compared to yellow [χ2(1) = 2.17, p = 0.141] and blue items
[χ2(1) = 1.45, p = 0.229], but was signiﬁcantly higher for red
compared to green items [χ2(1) = 9.72, p = 0.002]. With respect
to color-speciﬁc guessing, post hoc analysis showed that the prob-
ability of guessing “blue” was signiﬁcantly higher than random
unbiased guessing [0.30 vs. 0.25, χ2(1) = 10.08, p = 0.001]2.
DISCUSSION
Replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2, the probability
of remembering the color in which an object was visually pre-
sented during initial study varied as a function of color type,
with memory for the color of an object being higher for red
than for green-colored objects. Furthermore, again no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference was observed between red and yellow,
further supporting the view that red and yellow do not differ with
respect to binding strength. Other than in Experiments 1 and
2, although memory for the color of an object was descriptively
higher for red compared to blue-colored objects, the difference
failed to reach signiﬁcance. However, this may simply be a matter
of power because even when an effect is true, some experiments
will generate samples that do not satisfy the criterion for statis-
tical signiﬁcance (e.g., Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007). In order
to further explore the role of color type in the binding of color
2When considering only correct color responses rated as “sure” or “very sure” as
correctly remembered, color memory was high for red colors (M red = 41.3%),
medium for yellow and blue colors (M yellow = 37.7%; M blue = 36.5%), and low
for green colors (M green = 24.6%).
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features, we conducted a fourth experiment in which we tried to
replicate the ﬁndings of Experiment 3 under incidental learning
conditions.
EXPERIMENT 4: INCIDENTAL LEARNING
One characteristic of Experiments 1 to 3 is that participants were
instructed to study both the exemplars and the colors of the exem-
plars for a later memory test in the study phase. Thus, it may be
that the enhanced binding of red colors observed in Experiments
1 to 3 may reﬂect an effect that is based on more strategic compo-
nents of memory binding such as differential rehearsal strategies
(e.g., Cuvo, 1975). To rule out any effects of encoding strategies
in Experiment 4, we examined whether the binding of colors into
memory representations varies even as a function of color type
whenobjects are processedwithout any intentionof memorization
(i.e., incidental learning). The design and procedure of Experi-
ment 4 were similar to Experiment 3 with the only difference that
participants were not instructed to memorize the visual scenes for
a later memory test. Instead, they were presented the visual scenes
with the instruction to judge how realistic each pictures was (see
Figure 3D, left panel). A surprise memory test followed in which
memory for the presence of objects and the objects’ colors were
tested.
Previous research has demonstrated that observers show sub-
stantial memory for the color of perceived objects even when
objects were presented under incidental learning conditions (e.g.,
Brady et al., 2013), indicating that long-term memory represen-
tations of perceived objects are incidentally formed as a natural
product of perception. Thus, ﬁnding an increased memory for red
colors even when observers do not have any intention of remem-
bering the perceived objects later would indicate that the enhanced
binding of red automatically occurs as a basic phenomenon of our
processing of the external world.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-eight (31 females, M age = 25.2 years) undergraduate stu-
dents participated in the experiment for course credit. They were
tested individually. Participation was restricted to individuals who
were not colorblind (based on self-report). None of the partic-
ipants expected that they would be tested on memory later as
indicated by a post-experimental questionnaire.
Materials and procedure
The material was the same as that used in Experiment 3. The
procedurewas also similar to Experiment 3with the only exception
that participants were not told to memorize the visual scenes, but
instructed to judge how realistic each pictures was. No mention
was made that memory would be tested later. Eight visual scenes
containing four different objects colored in red, blue, yellow, or
green were presented one by one in random order for 10 s each.
The assignment of colors to objects was counterbalanced across
participants. After the presentation of a scene, participants were
instructed to evaluate how realistic the scene was using a ﬁve-
point rating scale (from 1 = unrealistic to 5 = very realistic). After
a 2-min distractor task (solving simple arithmetic problems), a
surprise memory test followed in which ﬁrst a free-recall test on
memory for the presence of objects was conducted, followed by a
memory test for the objects’ colors (for details, see Experiment 3).
RESULTS
Memory for the presence of an object and the color of an object
are shown in Table 1. Memory for the presence of an object
was not inﬂuenced by color [F(3,141) = 1.40, MSE = 0.025,
p = 0.245, η2p = 0.029; M recall = 48.1%]. However, the proba-
bility of correctly classifying the color of an object depended on
color type [F(3,141) = 4.69, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.091] and was
high for red-colored objects (M red = 0.46), medium for blue
and yellow-colored objects (M blue = 0.40; M yellow = 0.39),
and low for green-colored objects (M green = 0.33). The proba-
bility of erroneously reporting one of the remaining colors when
the color of an exemplar was misclassiﬁed did not signiﬁcantly
vary with color type [F(3,141) = 0.36, MSE = 0.036, p = 0.782,
η2p = 0.008].
The multinomial model did not optimally ﬁt the data
[χ2(5) = 12.89, p = 0.024]. Still, stable maximum likelihood
estimates could be derived for each of the model’s parameters.
Replicating the above ANOVA results, the multinomial model
results (Figure 3D, right panel) showed signiﬁcant variations in
the memory parameter R [χ2(3) = 10.10, p = 0.018, but not in
the guessing parameter G [χ2(2) = 2.72, p = 0.257]. Planned
pairwise comparisons conﬁrmed that parameter R was signiﬁ-
cantly increased for red objects compared to blue [χ2(1) = 4.41,
p = 0.036] and green objects [χ2(1) = 9.52, p = 0.002], but was
not different compared to yellowobjects [χ2(1)= 2.49, p= 0.115].
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 4 closely replicate the pattern of results
observed in Experiments 1 to 3. The probability of remembering
the color in which an object was presented during initial study var-
ied as a function of color type. Memory for the color of objects was
higher for red than for blue and green-colored objects, and again,
although memory for red colors was descriptively higher than for
yellow colors, no statistically signiﬁcant difference was observed
between red and yellow colors. These ﬁndings demonstrate that
the binding of color features into object memory representations
varies as a function of color type even when observers do not have
any intentionof remembering the perceived objects later. Thus, the
enhanced binding of red colors in memory seems to be a natural
product of perception.
COMBINED DATA SET
The pattern of results observed across the four Experiments for the
memory of the color of an object was rather similar. Memory for
the color of an object was higher for red-colored objects compared
to blue and green-colored objects, whereas no signiﬁcant differ-
ence in color memory between red and yellow-colored objects was
observed. However, statistically, the difference between red and
blue-colored objects failed to reach signiﬁcance in one Experiment
(visual scenes), and even though there was no statistically signiﬁ-
cant difference observed between red and yellow-colored objects,
descriptively, memory for red colors was slightly higher than for
yellow colors in all but one of the experiments (visual scenes). Both
aspects may reﬂect matters of power because when power is not
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extremely high, true effects may not necessarily always be reﬂected
in statistically signiﬁcant effects, especially when effect sizes are
small (e.g., Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007). Accordingly, in order
to increase power and get a more robust estimate of the effects of
colors, we ﬁnally combined the data from the four experiments.
MEMORY PERFORMANCE FOR COLORS
As shown in Figure 4A, the probability of correctly classi-
fying the color in which an object was presented varied as
a function of color type [F(3,546) = 19.25, MSE = 0.035,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10]. The probability of correctly classi-
fying the color of an object was higher for red or yellow-
colored objects than for blue or green-colored objects [red vs.
blue: t(183) = 3.94, p < 0.001, d = 0.29; red vs. green:
t(183) = 6.86, p< 0.001, d = 0.51; yellow vs. blue: t(183) = 3.28,
p = 0.001, d = 0.24; yellow vs. green: t(183) = 6.06, p < 0.001,
d = 0.45], and also higher for blue than for green-colored
objects [t(183) = 2.72, p = 0.007, d = 0.20]; color mem-
ory did not differ between red and yellow-colored objects
[t(183) = 0.34, p = 0.734, d = 0.06]. By contrast, the prob-
ability of erroneously reporting one of the remaining color
when the color of an object was misclassiﬁed did not differ
between color types [F(3,543) = 1.22, MSE = 0.038, p = 0.301,
η2p = 0.007]3.
SUBJECTIVE CONFIDENCE
To this point, we have demonstrated that memory for the color of
an object is high for red-colored and yellow-colored objects, and
particularly low for green-colored objects. To examine whether
this patternobserved inobjectivememoryperformance is reﬂected
in subjective conﬁdences in color memories as well, we examined
the participants’ conﬁdence in their color memories for the com-
bined data set, depending on whether the memories were actually
correct or wrong (see Figure 4B)4. When an answer was cor-
rect, conﬁdence was high for red-colored objects, medium for
yellow or blue-colored objects, and low for green-colored objects
[F(3,504) = 11.65, MSE = 0.434, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07]. Planned
comparisons revealed that conﬁdence ratings were signiﬁcantly
increased for correctly remembered red colors (all ts > 2.93,
ps < 0.004), and signiﬁcantly decreased for correctly remem-
bered green colors (all ts < −3.18, ps < 0.002), compared to
each of the other three colors. When an answer was wrong, the
reversed pattern occurred. Conﬁdence when making errors was
low for red-colored objects, medium for yellow or blue-colored
objects, and high for green-colored objects [F(3,492) = 17.86,
MSE = 0.358, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10]. Conﬁdence ratings were
signiﬁcantly decreased when the color of red objects was falsely
remembered (all ts < −2.93, ps < 0.004), and signiﬁcantly
increased when the color of green objects was falsely remembered
(all ts > 3.55, ps < 0.001), compared to each of the other three
colors. Thus, observers were not only more likely to remember
3Due to slight differences in the procedure between the four studies (i.e., additional
color gray in Experiment 2), it was not possible to apply a multinomial model to the
combined data set.
4Subjective conﬁdence judgments were analyzed for the combined data set in order
to get a more robust estimate of the effects of colors on subjective conﬁdence ratings.
the color of an object if it was red, they were also more accu-
rate in their conﬁdence ratings of color memories in case of red.
By contrast, in case of green colors, observers were not only
more prone to making mistakes when trying to remember the
color of an object, but they also were more conﬁdent in their
errors.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that the
binding of colors into object memory representations differs for
different types of colors. When objects were colored in red or
yellow, color wasmore strongly bound to objects inmemory, com-
pared to when objects were colored in blue or green, which was
the color that was most poorly bound. Such a ﬁnding indicates
that feature binding in memory is not a uniform process by which
any attended feature of a stimulus is automatically bound into a
unitary memory representation. Rather, our results suggest that
binding in memory can vary across different subtypes of features,
a ﬁnding that supports recent ﬁndings showing that the features
of objects are stored in visual memory rather independently from
each other (Fougnie and Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2013).
The observed pattern of results is consistent with the idea that
colors signal the importance of objects (Edmunds, 1974; Nunn,
1999; Dominy and Lucas, 2001). In both animals and humans,
objects which are of particular signiﬁcance for one’s own survival
often show red colors (Parsons, 1995; Elliot and Niesta, 2008).
Like red, yellow has also been linked to aposematism in insects
and reptiles (Ruxton et al., 2004; Stevens and Ruxton, 2012), and
is commonly used as a warning signal in human culture (Parsons,
1995). Accordingly, a stronger binding of red and yellow colors
might be adaptive to retain the signiﬁcance of individual objects
for one’s issues and goals. Green, by contrast, is the color which is
most frequent in nature due to the fact that chlorophyll, which is
used by most of the plants to gain energy, does not absorb green
light. Thus, green might be the color which is least informative
because simply almost everything is green. Indeed, as opposed to
signal colors like red or yellow, animals use green color as cam-
ouﬂage to blend with their environment, a behavior which is also
imitated by humans by wearing green clothing in military and
similar ﬁelds.
The ﬁnding that binding is stronger for red and yellow colors
compared to blue and green colors is also in line with previous
ﬁndings on the effects of colors on attention. As often noted in
applied contexts such as advertisement and design, warm colors
such as red and yellow seem to attract more attention, whereas
cool colors such as blue and green seem to attract less atten-
tion (e.g., Graham, 2005). Indeed, this has been supported by
more basic research, showing that warm colors are more salient
than cool colors (e.g., Gelasca et al., 2005; Frey et al., 2011). For
instance, using a visual search paradigm, Lindsey et al. (2010) have
recently demonstrated that search times are shortest for (desat-
urated) warm colors, such as red and orange, and longest for
(desaturated) cool colors, such as blue and green, suggesting that
warm colors more strongly attract attention. Accordingly, because
attention is assumed to be one of the main prerequisites for the
binding of features into object representations (e.g., Treisman and
Gelade, 1980), differential attentional attraction may represent the
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FIGURE 4 | Combined data set. Color effects on (A) the probability of correctly classifying an object’s color (saturated colors) and erroneously reporting a color
in case of misclassiﬁcation (pale colors), and (B) subjective conﬁdence in correct and wrong color memories for the combined data set. Error bars represent SE
of the means.
cognitive mechanism that underlies the differential binding of col-
ors in memory. Indeed, the assumption that increased attention
to a color feature can produce an enhanced binding of that feature
is also supported by the memory results for oddball color pictures
in Experiment 2. Gray colors that seem not to serve any signal-
ing function (e.g., Parsons, 1995; Stevens and Ruxton, 2012) were
nevertheless strongly bound into memory representations when
representing oddball features that are known to attract attention
due to the standing out from the context (e.g., Remington et al.,
1992).
In the present experiments, participants were asked to provide
a categorical memory response rather than to reproduce the exact
colorimetric properties of the remembered colors. Accordingly,
the question arises whether the observed differences in correctly
classifying the color of differentially colored objects reﬂects color
effects at the level of perceptual color experiences or at the level
of conceptual color categories. While our data do not allow to
draw conclusions on the ability to remember the exact colorimet-
ric properties of the color of objects, the fact that a similar pattern
was found even when objects were processed without any inten-
tion of memorization seems to rule out the possibility that the
observed effects were based on associations between objects and
conceptual color categories because it seems unlikely that color
category names are activated under incidental learning conditions.
In all four experiments, stimuli of low evolutionary signiﬁ-
cance were used that were not pre-experimentally associated with
any particular color. Doing so, we found that memory for the color
a stimulus was particularly high for objects that were colored in
red or yellow, and particularly low for objects colored in green. As
mentioned above, such a pattern is well in line with evolutionary
considerations, suggesting that red and yellow colors serve as sig-
nals indicating an object’s signiﬁcance for one’s own survival both
in animals and humans (Parsons, 1995; Elliot and Niesta, 2008;
Stevens and Ruxton, 2012). Such an account would predict that
the effects of color type on feature binding inmemorymay even be
much larger for stimuli that have a higher degree of evolutionary
signiﬁcance (e.g., a person of the opposite sex dressed in red, blue,
yellow, or green, see e.g., Elliot and Niesta, 2008, or fruits differing
in ripeness, e.g., Dominy and Lucas, 2001). Thus, further explor-
ing the role of evolutionary signiﬁcance in color binding may be
an important avenue for further research.
The results of the present study may be of considerable
importance for basic color research and research on information
processing in the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology in general because
numerous studies have used colors rather arbitrary to examine
a variety of cognitive functions without taking into account the
possibility of systematic effects of different colors. Furthermore,
our results may be important in a variety of applied settings like,
for instance, eyewitness testimony. An eyewitness is often asked to
recall information about the color of a person’s clothes, the color
of a car, or the color of other objects associated with a witnessed
event. Our ﬁndings suggest that the probability of remembering
color features of a critical event is not equal for different colors.
Instead, eyewitness memories should be more likely to include the
color of objects when they were red or yellow, whereas it should be
harder to remember color features when objects were blue or espe-
cially green. In addition, the subjective conﬁdence of eyewitnesses
in their color memories should differentiate well between objec-
tively correct and incorrect color memories in case of red-colored
objects, but poorly in case of green-colored objects. In otherwords,
if you were a smart gangster, you should drive a green rather than
a red or a yellow car.
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